SECOND DIVISION
MARCELITO D. QUEVADA, G.R. No. 140798
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-
versus -
AZCUNA,
and
GARCIA,
JJ.
COURT
OF APPEALS and Promulgated:
JUANITO
N. VILLAVERDE,
Respondents. September 19, 2006
x
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review[1]
by Marcelito D. Quevada,
assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated
The facts[2]
of the case are as follows:
Before the [Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)], the plaintiff/respondent said that he is the
lessor of a parcel of land with a residential house in Sampaloc, P2,500.
After expiration of the lease, they entered into another
Contract of Lease, which was an extension of the previous date, commencing from
After the expiration of the extended Lease, the petitioner continued
possessing the premises, but without payment of any reasonable compensation (for the use and occupancy
thereof).
[Private respondent] made several demands to the petitioner to vacate the
premises but was refused; as a matter of fact, the petitioner
refused to vacate without justifiable reason.
Because of
the [petitioner’s] refusal to vacate the
premises, [private respondent] referred the matter to
the barangay court for conciliation, only for the former to repudiate the
“agreement to vacate as of
On January 20, 1998, [private
respondent] served upon the petitioner a notice to
vacate the leased property within a period of fifteen (15) days supposedly
counted from receipt thereof, to pay P5,000 rental starting May,
1996, and every month thereafter until the premises shall have been vacated.
It was, on the other hand, the answer of the petitioner that as early
as November,
[1985],[3] he already started
building the house on the lot which was finished in [1986],[4] at which time he occupied the house as
his residence.
Sometime in 1994, the [private]
respondent
negotiated for the purchase of the lot from the previous owner; [petitioner] similarly offered to buy
the lot but was not able to raise the amount of P1,000,000 representing the
purchase price.
Herein
[private] respondent in turn “advised” him that he would go ahead
and buy the lot but with an assurance that as soon as [petitioner] would be in a financial
position to do
payment, [the former] will transfer the title to [the latter.] [T]hus, a Lease Contract, in
the meantime, was executed, for him to pay the rentals at P2,500 a month, but only with respect to the
land, since the house belonged to him.
On
his (petitioner) part, he assured the [private] respondent that if he would not be
able to purchase the lot after a reasonable period of time, then, he was
willing to deliver possession of the house to the [private]
respondent
after payment of the
cost, or the
sum of P500,000.
The [private]
respondent did not give
him a chance to pay the purchase price by setting a deadline to do the payment; similarly, the [private] respondent refused to
accept the monthly rental of the lot for P2,500.
Because of [private
respondent’s refusal] to accept the rental payments, [petitioner] opened an account “in
trust” for the
[private respondent] where the monthly rentals
could be deposited.
Petitioner added that there was an implied trust by
virtue of the “true agreement” whereby the purchase price of the lot would be
paid by the [private] respondent and for the
latter, later on, to
transfer the title
after he ([private]
respondent)
shall have paid the purchase price.
In its Decision dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of [private respondent] ordering [petitioner]:
a) and all persons claiming rights under him to immediately
vacate and surrender to
[private respondent] the leased premises
situated at 842 Vicente G. Cruz St., Sampaloc, Manila subject to the right of [petitioner] to remove the
improvements existing thereon;
b) to pay reasonable compensation for the continued use and
occupancy of subject lot in the amount of P2,500 monthly from May, 1996
until subject premises is finally vacated and surrendered to [private respondent];
c) the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner
appealed, but the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
WHEREFORE
and finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the same is
hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner
then went on appeal again
asking for reversal of the RTC Decision. The CA
rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the CA Decision
was denied.
Hence, this petition
relying upon the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT AN
IMPLIED TRUST WAS CREATED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHO THEREBY BECOMES THE
BENEFICIAL OWNER OF THE LOT IN QUESTION AND, THUS, ENTITLED TO CONTINUED
POSSESSION THEREOF.
II.
AT THE VERY LEAST,
PETITIONER OUGHT TO BE REIMBURSED FOR THE VALUE OF THE HOUSE STANDING ON THE
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE [MeTC] TO HEAR THE INSTANT CASE
CONSIDERING THAT THE ALLEGED UNLAWFUL WITHHOLDING OCCURRED MORE THAN ONE YEAR
BEFORE THE FILING OF THE EJECTMENT SUIT.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RIGHT OF THE RESPONDENT TO BRING THE ACTION FOR
EJECTMENT ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT THE TITLED OWNER THEREOF.
Simply restated, the issues to be
resolved are: 1) whether the action for ejectment is proper; 2) whether such action
can be brought by private respondent who is not the titled owner of the
property; 3) whether petitioner can be reimbursed for the value of the house on
the property; and 4) whether there is an implied trust.
A discussion of
these issues shows that the
petition is partly meritorious.
First, the
action for ejectment
or, more specifically, unlawful detainer or desahucio
is under the proper
jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1.
Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the
provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession
of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth,
or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the
restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. [Underscoring supplied.]
The necessary allegations in private
respondent’s complaint clearly meet the requirements of
the above-cited provision in
filing an action for unlawful detainer.[8] Moreover, in
accordance with the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, such action is
within the jurisdiction of the MeTC[9]
and must be filed within one year.[10]
As a lessor,
private respondent was
unlawfully deprived possession of the residential
house after petitioner’s right to its
possession as lessee
had expired on
Under Section 2, Rule 70, such
action by the lessor shall be commenced after demand to
pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the
lessee, thus:
SEC.
2.
Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. — Unless otherwise
stipulated, such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or
comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written
notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such
notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith
after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of
buildings. [Underscoring supplied.]
The lease
contract was not extended again after its
expiration on
“[P]ossession
by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor
by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy.”[12] “The situation
is not much different from that of a tenant whose lease expires but who
continues in occupancy by tolerance of the owner,
in which case there is deemed to be an unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession as of the date of the demand to vacate.”[13]
Aside from the
fact that the lease contract had expired, petitioner also
did not honor the agreement
to vacate as of
Besides,
while the dispute is under conciliation, the prescriptive period
for the cause of action was interrupted upon filing of
the complaint with the punong barangay and resumed
to run upon receipt by private
respondent of the
certificate to file action dated
SECTION 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. — x x x
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. — While the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.
x x
x
Necessarily,
the prescriptive period was suspended while the case was pending before the barangay
authorities. The 60-day period under the
above provision shall be deducted from the one-year period within which to file
the action for ejectment.
Even assuming that
there was an agreement to pay monthly rent after
Second, private
respondent may bring the action for
unlawful detainer, even though
he is not the titled owner of the leased property.
Such
action has “for
its object the recovery of the physical possession”[23]
or determination of “who is entitled
to possession de
facto”[24]
“of the leased premises (the house)[,]
not the ownership of the lot”[25]
and not its “legal
possession, in the sense contemplated in civil law.”[26]
In
fact, “any finding of the court
regarding the issue of ownership is merely provisional and not conclusive.”[27]
The
judgment rendered “shall
not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case
between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.”[28]
The Court has consistently
held that the only issue to be resolved in unlawful detainer or desahucio
is the actual “physical
or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the party litigants. Ejectment cases
are designed to summarily restore physical possession to one who has been
illegally deprived of such possession, without prejudice to
the settlement of the parties’ opposing claims of
juridical possession in appropriate proceedings.”[29] Those in actual
possession of property under any
“right entitling
them to the use of the same may
maintain an action for ejectment against a wrongful possessor.”[30] Thus, a mere
lessor may file such action.
Petitioner should not trifle with the
summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting
someone else’s ownership over the leased property.[31] The proceedings are “only
intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or
right to possession of property. Title is not
involved.”[32] In fact, the
absence of title is
not a ground “to withhold relief from the parties
x x x.”[33] “It
does not even matter if a party’s
title to the property is questionable x x x.”[34] “[N]o
questions can be raised or decided incidentally tending to defeat the title or
right of possession evidenced by the documents introduced”[35]
by petitioner.
“The
distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for
recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is settled in our
jurisprudence.”[36] The underlying philosophy behind the former “is
to prevent breach of peace and criminal disorder and to compel”[37]
parties out of possession to respect and resort to the law
alone in order to obtain what they
claim are theirs. Petitioner “is
necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property, but his possession
eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to
possess.”[38] His prior physical possession of the leased
property does not automatically entitle him to continue in its possession and
does not give him “a better right to the property.”[39]
Third, petitioner should
be paid for the value of the portion of the
house covered by the lease, to be
offset against rentals due.
Article 448 of the Civil Code
provides:
ARTICLE 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own
the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner
of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and
in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
The above-cited
article “covers only cases in which the builders, sowers[,] or
planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have
a claim of title thereto. It
does not apply when the interest is x x x that of x x x a mere tenant x x x.”[40] However, it is
also applied to cases where
a builder has “constructed
improvements with the consent of the owner.”[41]
Petitioner
is not the owner of or claiming title to the land, but a mere tenant[42] occupying
only a portion of the house on it under the lease contract between him and
private respondent. No supporting
evidence was presented showing that petitioner’s construction of the house was
with the consent of the land’s previous owner, but good faith should be
presumed,[43] particularly since the lease
relationship was open and in plain view.
Neither is there
a showing of
bad faith in petitioner’s
refusal to vacate the land.[44] On the other
hand, there is no indication that private
respondent will oblige petitioner to pay the
price of the land.
In fact, the former refuses to sell it to the
latter.[45] As a mere tenant, however,
petitioner must pay reasonable rent for the continued
use and occupancy of the leased premises from
the time the lease contract expired until he finally vacates and surrenders it
to private respondent.
It would
not be fair for
private respondent to receive
both the rent and the portion of the house covered by the
lease. As to its
valuation, there is only petitioner’s assertion that it cost
P500,000. In order to
satisfy the demands of substantial justice, morality, conscience, and fair
dealing, and pursuant to equity and the
principle proscribing unjust enrichment, the
value of the portion of the house covered by the
lease should be determined
so that compensation of its value
against the rentals due can
take effect.
In
their exercise of rights and
performance of duties, everyone must act with justice.[46] Although he asserts
that his ownership of the house is not refuted,
petitioner is willing to receive reimbursement
for its value. Similarly, by
insisting on ejecting petitioner, private
respondent in effect elects to appropriate the building.[47] “The
fundamental doctrine of unjust
enrichment is the transfer of value without just cause or
consideration.”[48] Therefore, to have a just
transfer of the leased portion of the house, its value
should be offset[49]
against the reasonable rent due for its continued use and occupancy until the
former vacates and surrenders it to
the latter.
Private respondent shall
not be inequitably profited or enriched at petitioner’s
expense.[50] Nemo
cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest.[51]
Fourth, there is no implied trust. Petitioner fails to support his assertion that
such has been created in his favor and that the purchase of the land by private
respondent is for and in his behalf.
“A
trust is defined as a ‘fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves
the existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title to the
property to deal with it for the benefit of another. A person who establishes a trust is called the
trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as regards property for the benefit
of another is known as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust
has been created is referred to as the beneficiary or cestui que trust.’”[52]
Aside
from the lessor-lessee relationship between them, no other legal relationship exists
that shows the equitable ownership in the land belonging to petitioner and its legal
title to private respondent. No
resulting or constructive trust has been shown to arise from the relationship
of the parties. Verily, the agreement to
vacate on
Article
1450 of the Civil Code does not apply,[54]
to wit:
ARTICLE 1450. If the price of a sale of property is loaned
or paid by one person for the benefit of another and the conveyance is made to
the lender or payer to secure the payment of the debt, a trust arises by
operation of law in favor of the person to whom the money is loaned or for whom
it is paid. The latter may redeem the
property and compel a conveyance thereof to him.
The conveyance of the property was
not from petitioner, but rather from its previous owner, to private
respondent. No evidence is presented to
show that such conveyance was to secure payment of a debt. Thus, there is no resulting trust. Private respondent is under no obligation in
equity to hold his legal title to the land for the benefit of petitioner.
There
is no constructive trust either. Private
respondent is not alleged to have obtained or held the legal right thereto by
fraud, duress, or abuse of confidence. Again,
in the absence of proof showing that private respondent has fraudulently
registered the land in his name, petitioner has no right to recover it under
Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which states:
ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
“While
an implied trust may be proved orally (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art.
1457), the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme
caution, because such kind of evidence may be easily fabricated x x x. It cannot be made to rest on vague and
uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal[,] or indefinite declarations x x x.”[55] “[T]he burden of proving the existence of a
trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and
satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements.”[56]
WHEREFORE,
the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53209, dated September
16, 1999 and November 11, 1999, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED BUT WITH THE
MODIFICATION that the case
is REMANDED to the court a quo,
which shall immediately conduct the appropriate proceedings to assess the value
of the leased portion of the house against which the reasonable rent due for
its continued use and occupancy, until it is vacated and surrendered to private
respondent, may be offset.
No
costs.
SO
ORDERED.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chairperson
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] RULES OF COURT, Rule 45.
[2] Rollo, pp. 26-28; CA Decision, pp. 2-4.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Rollo, p. 39; CA Decision, p. 15.
[8] Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., G.R. No.
155110,
[9] THE 1991 REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE, Sec. 1.A(1).
[10] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1147 (1).
[11] Manila Electric Co. v. IAC, G.R. No. 71393, June 28, 1989, 174 SCRA 313, 321, quoting Cuaycong v. Benedicto, 37 Phil. 781, 792-793 (1918).
[12] Heirs
of Rafael Magpily v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 167748, November 8, 2005, 474 SCRA
366, 378, citing Santos v. Ayon, G.R.
No. 137013, May 6, 2005, 458 SCRA 83, 92.
[13] Cañiza v. CA, 335 Phil. 1107, 1116 (1997).
[14] The notice was received by
petitioner’s wife on
[15] THE 1991 REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE, Sec. 18.
[16] See Macasaet v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 154391-92, September 30, 2004, 439
SCRA 625, 635, citing Lopez v. David, Jr.,
G.R. No. 152145, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 542; Arcal v. CA, 348 Phil. 813, 825 (1998); and Villaluz v. CA, 344 Phil. 77, 89 (1997).
[17] Rollo, p. 35; CA Decision, p. 11.
[18] The CA, quoting the lower court, said that “[t]he extended period is based on the manner by which rental is paid. In the [present case], rent was paid monthly and[,] therefore, defendant’s lease contract was renewed on a month-to-month basis until notice of termination was given.” Id. at 32, 69, and 76; CA Decision, p. 8; RTC Decision, p. 5; MeTC Decision, p. 4.
[19] See Inductivo v. CA, G.R. No. 108196,
[20] Lopez
v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 157971, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 664, 674, citing La Jolla, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 115851,
June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 102, 110; Arquelada
v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 139137, March 31, 2000, 329 SCRA 536,
553-554; and Palanca v. IAC, G.R. No.
71566, December 15, 1989, 180 SCRA 119, 129.
[21] Dula v. Maravilla, G.R. No. 134267, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 249, 260, quoting De Vera v. CA, 329 Phil. 175, 180 (1996).
[22]
[23] Bishop
of
“Under the Spanish Civil Code we had the acción interdictal, a summary proceeding which could be brought within one year from dispossession x x x.” Pitargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, 10 (1952).
The summary action for forcible entry or detainer was “denominated acción interdictal under the former law of procedure Ley de injuiciamiento Civil.” Firmeza v. David, 92 Phil. 733, 735 (1953).
[24] Umpoc
v. Mercado, G.R. No. 158166,
[25] Ramos
v. Stateland Investment Corp., G.R. No. 161973, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA
726, 745, quoting Atienza, Sr. v. CA,
G.R. No. 94493, July 17, 1992, 211 SCRA 561, 564.
[26] Lao
v. Lao, G.R. No. 149599, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 539, 546, citing Tirona v. Alejo, 419 Phil. 285, 298
(2001).
[27] Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Heirs of Manuel Abella, G.R. No. 143510, November 23, 2005, 476 SCRA 1, 9.
[28] Barnes
v. Padilla, G.R. No. 160753, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 533, 543, citing Barba v. CA, 426 Phil. 598, 609 (2002)
and Hilario v. CA, G.R. No. 121865,
August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 420, 426, 329 Phil. 202, 208 (1996).
[29] Keppel
Bank Phils., Inc. v. Adao, G.R. No. 158227,
[30] Pascual v. Angeles, 4 Phil. 604, 607 (1905).
[31] See Arambulo v. Gungab, G.R. No. 156581, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA
640, 649, citing Rivera v. Rivera,
G.R. No. 154203,
[32] David
v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992,
[33] Ganila
v. CA, G.R. No. 150755,
[34] Pajuyo
v. CA, G.R. No. 146364,
[35] Pascual
v. Angeles, supra at 609, citing judgments of the supreme court of
[36] Ganila v. CA, supra at 445.
[37] David v. Cordova, supra at 403.
[38] Arambulo v. Gungab, supra at 651.
[39]
[40] Macasaet
v. Macasaet, supra note 16, at 643-644, citing Pada-Kilario v. CA, 379 Phil. 515, 529-530 (2000); Chua v. CA, 361 Phil. 308, 318 (1999); Balucanag v. Francisco, 207 Phil. 433,
438 (1983); Floreza v. de Evangelista,
G.R. No. 25462, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 130, 136; Quemuel v. Olaes, 111 Phil. 797, 803 (1961); and Alburo v. Villanueva, 7 Phil. 277, 280 (1907).
[41]
[42] In ruling for private respondent, the CA quoted the RTC Decision finding that petitioner “owns the house he is presently occupying x x x.” Rollo, pp. 33, 70, and 77; CA Decision, p. 9; RTC Decision, p. 6; MeTC Decision, p. 5.
[43] See Pleasantville Development Corp. v. CA, 323 Phil. 12, 22 (1996), applying CIVIL CODE, Art. 527.
[44] Rollo, p. 33; CA Decision, p. 9.
[45]
[46] CIVIL CODE, Art. 19.
[47] Rollo, pp. 13-15; Petition for Review, pp. 11-13.
[48] P.C.
Javier & Sons, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 129552,
[49] CIVIL CODE, Arts. 1278, 1279, and 1290.
[50] See Soriano v. CA, G.R. No. 78975,
[51] Francisco
v. IAC, G.R. No. 75909,
[52] Tala
Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No.
137533, November 22, 2002, 392 SCRA 506, 533-534, quoting Huang v. CA, G.R. No. 108525, September 13, 1994, 236 SCRA 420, 428,
and citing IV A. Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES 669 (1991) and the CIVIL CODE, Art. 1440.
[53] Rollo, p. 35; CA Decision, p. 11.
[54] See Nakpil v. IAC, G.R. No. 74449,
[55] Ong
Ching
[56] Morales
v. CA, G.R. No. 117228,